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Abstract
Machine learning models leak information about their training data every time they
reveal a prediction. This is problematic when the training data needs to remain
private. Private prediction methods limit how much information about the training
data is leaked by each prediction. Private prediction can also be achieved using
models that are trained by private training methods. In private prediction, both
private training and private prediction methods exhibit trade-offs between privacy,
privacy failure probability, amount of training data, and inference budget. Although
these trade-offs are theoretically well-understood, they have hardly been studied
empirically. This paper presents the first empirical study into the trade-offs of
private prediction. Our study sheds light on which methods are best suited for which
learning setting. Perhaps surprisingly, we find private training methods outperform
private prediction methods in a wide range of private prediction settings.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are frequently trained on data that needs to remain private, even though
the predictions produced by those models are revealed to the outside world. For example, a hotel
recommendation model may be trained on hotel reservation data that its users should not have access
to. Unless proper care is taken, a user of a hotel recommendation service may be able to extract hotel
reservation data of other users from the recommendations they receive, which would result in a privacy
violation [7, 16, 37, 38, 44]. Such privacy violations may happen even when users do not have direct
access to the model parameters but only to model predictions: several studies have demonstrated that
it is possible to reconstruct model parameters from a series of model predictions [6, 29, 39].
The goal of private prediction is to prevent such privacy violations by limiting the amount of
information about the training data that can be obtained from a series of model predictions [11].
Private prediction methods [4, 9, 11, 32] perturb the predictions of non-private models to obfuscate
any information that can be inferred about the data used to trained those models. Private training
methods [1, 3, 8, 23, 31, 42, 40] can be used to obtain private predictions as well. In particular, private
training guarantees that model parameters reveal little information about the training data. As a result,
the predictions of privately trained models do not leak information about the training data either.
Both private prediction and private training methods exhibit a range of trade-offs when they are
used in a private prediction setting. Specifically, there exist trade-offs between the accuracy of the
predictions, the privacy level that can be guaranteed, the probability of a privacy failure, the number
of predictions that is revealed publicly (i.e., the inference budget), and the amount of training data.
While these trade-offs are theoretically well understood, little is known about them empirically. Prior
empirical studies evaluate only private training methods and do not consider the private prediction
setting [20, 21]. This paper performs an empirical study into the trade-offs of private prediction. We
aim to provide guidance to practitioners on which private prediction methods are most suitable for
a given learning setting. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that private training methods offer a better
privacy-accuracy trade-off than private prediction methods in many practical learning settings.
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2 Problem Statement
Consider a private machine learning model φ(x; θ) with parameters θ that given a D-dimensional
input vector, x ∈ RD, produces a probability vector over C classes y ∈ ∆C . Herein, ∆C represents
the (C−1)-dimensional probability simplex. The parameters θ were obtained by fitting the model on
a training set of N labeled examples, D = {(x1,y1), . . . , (xN ,yN )}, that needs to remain private.
We consider the common scenario in which machine learning model φ(·) is provided as a service to
other parties by the model owner. Specifically, someone provides a vector xˆ to the owner of the model,
who uses it to compute yˆ = φ(xˆ; θ) and publicly reveals the prediction yˆ. From the perspective of
the model owner, there is an inherent risk here that whoever observes (xˆ, yˆ) obtains information
about the private training set D through the model query: prediction yˆ carries information about
parameters θ that, in turn, carries information about the private training set D.
The model owner is interested in limiting the amount of information that others can learn about
the private training set D via an inference budget of B queries, Q = {xˆ1, . . . , xˆB}, to model φ(·).
Specifically, the model owner aims to provide an (, δ)-differential privacy guarantee [12] on the
information that is leaked about D by releasing B predictions:
Pr [φ (xˆb; θ(D)) ⊆ Yb : b = 1, . . . , B] ≤ ePr [φ (xˆb; θ(D′)) ⊆ Yb : b = 1, . . . , B] + δ, (1)
for  ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0, ∀Yb ⊆ ∆C , ∀Q with |Q| = B, and for all datasets D and D′ that differ in only
one training example. Herein, we adopt the short-hand notation θ(D) to indicate the parameters θ
that were obtained by training the model on training set D. The model owner can limit the amount of
information that the predictions leak about training set D in two primary ways:
1. The model owner can perform private training [4, 9, 11, 32] of model φ(·). Differentially private
training guarantees that the model parameters θ reveal little information about training set D.
Because differential privacy is closed under post-processing [10], the model owner can reveal
B =∞ predictions (or the model parameters) and still maintain the property in Equation 1.
2. The model owner can perform private prediction [1, 3, 8, 23, 31, 42, 40] using a model φ′(·)
that is not itself differentially private. Private prediction methods construct φ(·) from φ′(·) in a
way that limits the amount of information that φ(·) reveals about D through B predictions.
3 Methods
This study performs an empirical analysis of both private training and private prediction methods.
We adopt a regularized empirical risk minimization framework in which we minimize:
J(θ;D) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
`(φ′(xn; θ),yn) + λR(θ) (2)
with respect to θ, where `(·) is a loss function, R(·) is a regularizer, and λ ≥ 0 is a regularization
parameter. Some of the private prediction methods that we study make one or more of the following
assumptions to obtain the privacy guarantee in Equation 1:
1. The loss function `(·) is strictly convex, continuous, and differentiable everywhere.
2. The regularizer R(θ) is 1-strongly convex, continuous, and differentiable everywhere w.r.t. θ.
3. The non-randomized model φ′(·) is linear in x, that is, φ′(x; θ) = θ>x.
4. The loss function `(·) is Lipschitz with a constant K, that is, ‖∇l‖2 ≤ K.
5. The inputs are contained in the unit L2 ball, that is, ‖x‖2 ≤ 1 for all x.
Detailed algorithms of all methods and proofs of all theorems are presented in the appendix.
3.1 Private Training
We consider three private training methods in this study: (1) the model sensitivity method, (2) loss
perturbation, and (3) differentially private stochastic gradient descent (SGD).
Model sensitivity. A simple private training method is for the model owner to add noise to the model
parameters in order to hide information about the training data that is captured in those parameters.
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Figure 1: Test accuracy on MNIST dataset as a function of privacy loss  for inference budget
B = 100. In 1b,  ranges between 0 and 1 because of limitations in some methods when δ > 0.
The model sensitivity method [8] constructs differentially private parameters θ by adding noise to
the minimizer of J(·). Specifically, we extend [8] to multi-class linear models with θ ∈ RD×C and
sample the noise matrix B from p(B) ∝ e−β‖B‖F . To satisfy the property in Equation 1, we choose
β = Nλ2K . In practice, we adopt the multi-class logistic loss which has a Lipschitz constant K =
√
2.
Theorem 1. Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the model sensitivity method is (, 0)-differentially
private.
By changing p(B) to a zero-mean isotropic Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ = 2Kα
Nλ
√
2
for an α that depends on  and δ, we can also obtain (, δ)-differentially private models for δ > 0 [2].
Theorem 2. Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the Gaussian model sensitivity method is (, δ)-
differentially private for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Loss perturbation. Rather than perturbing the learned parameters after training, the model owner can
instead randomly perturb the loss function that is minimized during training to obtain a differentially
private model [8, 23]. We extend the loss perturbation method of [8, 23] to multi-class classification
by minimizing the following randomly perturbed loss function:
J ′(θ;D) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
`(φ′(xn; θ),yn) +
λ
N
R(θ) +
1
N
tr(B>θ) +
1
2
ρ‖θ‖2F , (3)
where tr(·) represents the trace of a square matrix. The noise matrix B is sampled from p(B) ∝
e−β‖B‖F . The scale parameter of the noise distribution β = 2K , and the parameter ρ that governs
the additional L2 regularization is set such that ρ ≥ 2LC . The constant L is an upper bound on the
eigenvalues of the Hessian of `(·), that is, λmax(∇2`(θ>x,y)) ≤ L for all θ,x and y. We use a
multi-class logistic loss, which has a Hessian with eigenvalues bounded by L = 12 (see appendix).
Theorem 3. Given a convex loss function `(·), a convex regularizer R(·) with continuous Hessians,
assumptions 3, 4, and 5, and assuming that λmax(∇2`) ≤ L, the loss perturbation method is
(, 0)-differentially private.
By changing noise distribution p(B) into a zero-mean isotropic Gaussian distribution with standard
deviation σ = K
√
8 ln(2/δ) + 4, we can also obtain (, δ)-differential privacy for δ > 0 [23].
Theorem 4. Given a convex loss `(·), a convex regularizer R(·) with continuous Hessians, assump-
tions 3, 4, and 5, and assuming that λmax(∇2`) ≤ L, the Gaussian loss perturbation method is
(, δ)-differentially private.
Differentially private SGD (DP-SGD). Rather than post hoc perturbation of the final model param-
eters or pre hoc perturbation of the loss, the DP-SGD method limits the influence of individual
examples in parameter updates [1]. DP-SGD draws a batch B of training examples uniformly at
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Figure 2: Test accuracy on MNIST dataset as function of inference budget B for privacy loss  = 1.
random and computes the gradient gn =
∂J(θ;{(xn,yn)})
∂θ for each example in the batch. It clips the
resulting per-example gradients to have a norm bound of ν, aggregates the clipped gradients over the
batch, and adds Gaussian noise to obtain a private, approximate parameter gradient g˜:
g˜ =
1
|B|
 ∑
n∈{1,...,|B|}
 gn
max
(
1, ‖gn‖2ν
)
+N (0, σ2ν2I)
 , (4)
where σ2ν2 is the variance of the Gaussian, 0 is an appropriately sized vector of zeros, and I
an appropriately sized identity matrix. The resulting g˜ is used to perform the parameter update.
Akin to the model sensitivity method, choosing σ = 1
√
2 ln(1.25/δ) makes each g˜ vector (, δ)-
differentially private with respect to the examples in batch B. The privacy amplification theorem [22]
states that g˜ is (q, qδ)-differentially private with respect to examples from D, with q = |B|/N .
Privacy guarantees on the parameters learnt by DP-SGD after M parameter updates can be obtained
via a “moments accountant”. We use the moments accountant of [31], which uses an analysis based
on Rényi differential privacy [30] to compute the noise scale σ required for a given privacy loss ,
privacy failure probability δ, number of parameter updates M , batch size |B|, and training set size N .
3.2 Private Prediction
We consider two private prediction methods in this study: (1) the prediction sensitivity method and
(2) the subsample-and-aggregate method.
Prediction sensitivity. The prediction sensitivity method adds noise to the logits, lˆ = φ′(xˆ; θ),
predicted by the model. Specifically, it returns lˆ+b, where the noise vector b ∈ RC is sampled from
p(b) ∝ e−β‖b‖2 . Given an inference budget B, we use standard composition [12] and set β = Nλ2KB .
Theorem 5. Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the prediction sensitivity method is (, 0)-
differentially private.
We can obtain (, δ)-differentially private predictions for δ > 0 by sampling b from a zero-mean
isotropic Gaussian distribution [2]. Assuming δ > 0 also allows the use of the advanced composition
theorem [14, 15]. We set the standard deviation to σ = 2Kα
∗
Nλ∗ , where α
∗ depends on per-sample
privacy values ∗ and δ∗ that are found using a search algorithm (see appendix for details).
Theorem 6. Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the Gaussian prediction sensitivity method is
(, δ)-differentially private for δ ∈ (0, 1).
When the budget B is small, the σ obtained with standard composition can be smaller than that
obtained with advanced composition. In experiments, we always choose the smaller σ of the two.
Subsample-and-aggregate. Subsample-and-aggregate methods train T models on T subsets of
D, and perform differentially private aggregation of the predictions produced by the resulting
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Figure 4: Test accuracy on MNIST-1M dataset
as a function of training set size, N , for privacy
(, δ) = (1, 0) and inference budget B = 100.
models [4, 11, 32, 33]. We focus on the method of Dwork & Feldman [11] in this study. That
technique: (1) partitions the training dataset D into T disjoint subsets of size b|D|/Tc, (2) trains T
classifiers {φ′1(·; θ1), . . . , φ′T (·; θT )} on these subsets where φ′t(·) outputs a one-hot vector of size C,
and (3) applies a soft majority voting across the T classifiers at inference time. Hence, it predicts label
yˆ for input xˆ with probability proportional to exp(β · |{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(xˆ; θt) = yˆ}|). The
parameter β acts as an “inverse temperature” in the voting: privacy increases but accuracy decreases
as β goes to zero. Using the standard compositional properties of differential privacy [12], this
procedure achieves (, 0)-differential privacy with an inference budget of B by setting β = /B.
Theorem 7. The subsample-and-aggregate method with β = /B is (, 0)-differentially private.
If we allow δ > 0, we can use the advanced composition theorem [14, 15] in subsample-and-aggregate
to achieve (, δ)-differential privacy with noise scale β inversely proportional to the square of B.
Theorem 8. The subsample-and-aggregate method with β = max(β′, β′′), where β′ = /B and
β′′ =
√
2/B
(√
ln(1/δ) + −√ln(1/δ)), is (, δ)-differentially private.
4 Experiments
We evaluate the five private prediction methods in experiments with linear models on the MNIST [26]
dataset (4.2) and convolutional networks on the CIFAR-10 [24] dataset (4.3). Code reproducing our ex-
periments is available from https://github.com/facebookresearch/private_prediction.
4.1 Experimental Setup
In all experiments, we choose the loss function ` to be the multi-class logistic loss. When training
linear models, we minimize the loss using L-BFGS [45] with a line search that checks the Wolfe
conditions [41] for all methods except the DP-SGD method. We trained all models using L2-
regularization except when using the DP-SGD or subsample-and-aggregate methods. (We note that
these two methods have implicit regularization via gradient noise and ensembling, respectively.) We
selected regularization parameter λ via cross-validation in a range between 10−5 and 5 · 10−1. We
choose the clip value ν in DP-SGD by cross-validating over a range from 5 · 10−4 to 5 · 10−1. For
simplicity, we ignore the privacy leakage due to cross-validation and hyperparameter tuning in our
analysis. Unless noted otherwise, we perform subsample-and-aggregate with T = 256 models.
To evaluate the quality of our models, we measure their classification accuracy on the test set. Because
private prediction methods are inherently noisy, we repeat every experiment 100 times using the same
train-test split. We report the average accuracy corresponding standard deviation in all result plots.
4.2 Results: Linear Models
We first evaluate the performance of linear models on the MNIST handwritten digit dataset [26].
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Figure 5: Test accuracy on MNIST dataset for privacy (, δ) = (1, 0) and inference budget B = 100.
Accuracy as a function of privacy loss. Figure 1 displays the accuracy of the models on the test set
(higher is better) as a function of the privacy loss  (lower values imply more privacy) for an inference
budget of B = 100. The results are presented for two values of the privacy failure probability: δ = 0
in Figure 1a and δ = 10−5 in Figure 1b (DP-SGD does not support δ = 0). Recall that most methods
support both δ = 0 and δ > 0 by choosing different noise distributions or a different privacy analysis.
Figure 1 shows that the subsample-and-aggregate method outperforms the other methods for most
values of  in the δ = 0 regime, but is less competitive when δ = 10−5 (higher probability of privacy
failure). Loss perturbation performs best for small values of  (much privacy) when δ = 0. Model
sensitivity underperforms the other two methods when δ = 0 but is slightly more competitive when
δ = 10−5 due to the use of a Gaussian noise distribution. DP-SGD outperforms all other methods
when δ = 10−5. Prediction sensitivity performs poorly across the board.
Accuracy as a function of inference budget. Figure 1 shows experimental results for a particular
choice of inference budget (B = 100). In private prediction methods, the amount of privacy provided
changes when this budget changes. To investigate this trade-off, Figure 2 displays accuracy as a
function of the inference budget, B, for a privacy loss setting of  = 1. As before, we show results for
privacy failure probability δ = 0 (Figure 2a) and δ = 10−5 (Figure 2b). In the plots, private training
methods are horizontal lines because the amount of information they leak does not depend on B.
The results show that the subsample-and-aggregate method outperforms other private prediction
methods in the low-budget regime when δ = 0. However, this advantage vanishes when the number
of inferences that needs to be supported, B, grows. Specifically, loss perturbation outperforms
subsample-and-aggregate at B ' 80 predictions. The advantage also disappears when a small privacy
failure probability is allowed. For δ = 10−5, two private training methods (loss perturbation and
DP-SGD) perform at least as good as subsample-and-aggregate for all inference-budget values. We
also note that both loss perturbation and model sensitivity benefit greatly from making δ non-zero.
Accuracy as a function of privacy failure probability. Figure 3 studies the effect of varying the
privacy failure probability, δ, for a privacy loss of  = 1 and inference budget B = 100. The results
show that loss perturbation, DP-SGD, and model sensitivity work well even at very small values
of δ. By contrast, prediction sensitivity appears to require unacceptably high values of δ to obtain
acceptable accuracy. The subsample-and-aggregate method benefits the most from increasing δ.
Accuracy as a function of training set size. Accuracy and privacy are also influenced by the
number of training examples, N . Figure 4 studies this influence for privacy (, δ) = (1, 0) and
inference budget B = 100 on a dataset of up to one million digit images that were generated using
InfiMNIST [27]. (We do not include DP-SGD because it does not support δ = 0.) The results
show that subsample-and-aggregate is more suitable for settings in which few training examples
are available (small N ) because of the regularizing effect of averaging predictions over T models.
However, it benefits less from increasing the training set size when T remains fixed (recall that
T = 256). When N is large, loss perturbation and model sensitivity perform well because the scale
of the noise that needs to be added to obtain a certain value of  decreases as N increases.
6
10 6 10 5 10 4 10 3 10 2 10 1
Regularization parameter ( )
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Privacy loss ( )
0.5
1.0
2.0
5.0
(a) Loss perturbation: As a function of λ.
101 102 103
Number of models (T)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Privacy loss ( )
0.5
1.0
2.0
5.0
(b) Subsample-and-aggregate: As a function of T .
Figure 6: Test accuracy on MNIST dataset for privacy failure probability δ = 0 and budget B = 100.
Accuracy as a function of number of dimensions. Accuracy and privacy may also vary with model
capacity, which in linear models can be influenced via the number of input dimensions, D. Figure 5a
presents the results of experiments in which we varied D by applying PCA on the digit images. The
figure shows that loss perturbation and model sensitivity are more competitive when the model has
low capacity to memorize examples (D is small), because this implies less parameter noise is needed.
Accuracy as a function of number of classes. Figure 5b investigates accuracy as a function of the
number of classes, C. In this experiment, a digit classification problem with C ′ < C classes only
considers the first C ′ digits in the MNIST dataset (digits 0 to C ′− 1). Unsurprisingly, the accuracy of
all methods decreases as the number of classes increases due to the increase in the problem’s Bayes
error. The relative ranking of the methods appears to be largely independent of the number of classes.
Accuracy as a function of hyperparameters. Figure 6 studies the effect of: (1) theL2-regularization
parameter, λ, in loss perturbation and (2) the number of models, T , in subsample-and-aggregate. The
results show that models overfit to the perturbation when λ is too small, but underfit when λ is too
large. The optimal value for λ depends on . Similarly, larger values of T lead to higher accuracies
but accuracy deteriorates for very large values of T due to overfitting. We note that increasing T also
increases computational requirements for training and inference, which grow as O(T ).
4.3 Results: Convolutional Networks
We also evaluated the DP-SGD and subsample-and-aggregate methods2 on the CIFAR-10 dataset [24]
using a ResNet-20 model (with “type A” blocks [17]) as φ′(·). To facilitate the computation of
per-example gradients in DP-SGD, we replaced batch normalization by group normalization [43].
A non-private version of the resulting model achieves a test accuracy of 86.6% on CIFAR-10. All
convolutional networks are trained using SGD with a batch size of 600, with an initial learning rate
of 0.1. In all experiments, the learning rate was divided by 10 thrice after equally spaced numbers
of epochs. We use standard data augmentation during training: viz., random horizontal flipping and
random crop resizing. The T = 16 models used in subsample-and-aggregate were trained for 500
epochs. Because privacy loss increases with number of epochs in DP-SGD, we trained our DP-SGD
models for only 100 epochs. As before, we set the clip value ν in DP-SGD via cross-validation.
Figure 7 shows the accuracy of the resulting models as a function of privacy loss, , for inference
budget B = 10 (Figure 7a); and as a function of inference budget, B, for privacy loss  = 1
(Figure 7b). All results are for a privacy failure probability of δ = 10−5. The results in the figure
show that the subsample-and-aggregate method outperforms DP-SGD training in some regimes:
in particular, when B is small and  is large. In most other situations, however, DP-SGD appears
to be the best method to obtain private predictions from a ResNet-20: for privacy loss  = 1, it
surpasses subsample-and-aggregate for B ' 5 predictions. In terms of accuracy, both methods lead
to substantial losses in accuracy compared to a non-private model: even at a relatively large privacy
loss of  = 5, the best private model underperforms its non-private counterpart by at least 30%.
2Other private prediction methods cannot be used here because deep networks violate assumptions 1 and 3.
7
0 1 2 3 4 5
Privacy loss ( )
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Method
DP-SGD
Subs. & aggr.
Non-private
(a) As a function of privacy loss, , for B = 10.
100 101 102 103
Inference budget (B)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Method
DP-SGD
Subs. & aggr.
Non-private
(b) As a function of inference budget, B, for  = 1.
Figure 7: Test accuracy on CIFAR-10 dataset of ResNet-20 with group normalization for δ = 10−5.
5 Discussion
The results of our experiments demonstrate that there exist a range of complex trade-offs in private
prediction. We summarize these trade-offs in Table 1. The table provides an overview of how privacy,
accuracy, and computation are affected by increases in variables such as the number of training
examples, the inference budget, the number of input dimensions, the amount of regularization, etc. We
hope that this overview provides practitioners some guidance on the trade-offs of private prediction.
A perhaps surprising result of our study is that private training methods are often a better alternative
for private prediction than private prediction methods. Methods such as subsample-and-aggregate
appear to be most competitive for small inference budgets (tens or hundreds of test examples) and
for small training sets, but tend to be surpassed by private training methods otherwise. We surmise
that the main reason for this observation is that inference-budget accounting is fairly naive: the
privacy guarantees assume that privacy loss grows linearly (δ = 0) or with the square root (δ > 0) of
the number of inferences, which may be overly pessimistic. Inference-budget accounting may be
improved, e.g., using accounting mechanisms akin to those in the PATE family of algorithms [34, 36].
Another way in which private prediction methods may be improved is by making stronger assumptions
about the models with which they are used. In particular, the subsample-and-aggregate method is the
only method that treats models as a pure black box. This is an advantage in the sense that it provides
flexibility compared to private training methods that support only a small family of models: for
example, subsample-and-aggregate could also be used to make private predictions for decision trees.
But the flexibility of subsample-and-aggregate is also a weakness because it may cause the privacy
guarantees to be too pessimistic. Indeed, it may be possible to improve private prediction methods for
specific models by making additional assumptions about those models (linearity, smoothness, etc.) or
by adapting the models to make them more suitable for private training or prediction [35].
Table 1: Effect of six hyperparameters (columns) on privacy, accuracy, and computational properties
(rows): ↗ indicates that a property value goes up with the hyperparameter,↘ that it goes down,y
that it goes up and then down, and · · · that it remains unchanged. Effects for method-independent
hyperparameters are in the left columns: the number of training examples N , the number of classes
C, and the number of dimensions D. Effects for method-specific hyperparameters are in the right
columns: the inference budget B, the number of models T , and the L2-regularization parameter λ.
N C D B T λ
Privacy loss () ↘ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘
Privacy failure probability (δ) ↘ · · · · · · ↗ · · · ↘
Accuracy ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ y y
Training time ↗ ↗ ↗ · · · ↗ · · ·
Inference time · · · ↗ ↗ · · · ↗ · · ·
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Broader Impact
To date, there are a large number of machine-learning systems that are trained on data that needs to
remain private or confidential but that expose predictions to the outside world. Examples of such
systems include cloud services, content-ranking systems, and recommendation services. In controlled
settings, experiments have shown that it may be possible to extract private information from such
predictions. Yet, the machine-learning community currently has limited understanding of how much
private information can be leaked from such services and how this information leakage can be limited.
Over the past decade, a range of methods has been developed that aim to limit information leakage but
these methods have primarily been studied theoretically. Indeed, little is known about their empirical
performance in terms of the inevitable privacy-accuracy trade-off. This work helps to improve that
understanding. As such, we believe this study helps anyone whose data is used to train modern
machine-learning systems. In particular, our study can help the developers of those systems to better
understand the privacy risks in their systems and may also help them find better operating points on
the privacy-accuracy spectrum.
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A Preliminaries
As a reminder, we denote by φ(x; θ) a machine learning model with parameters θ that given a
D-dimensional input vector, x ∈ RD, produces a probability vector over C classes y ∈ ∆C , where
∆C represents the (C−1)-dimensional probability simplex. The parameters θ are obtained by fitting
the model on a training set of N labeled examples, D = {(x1,y1), . . . , (xN ,yN )}.
In the following we aim to bound the privacy loss on the training set D given a budget of B queries,
Q = {xˆ1, . . . , xˆB}, to the model φ(·).
We adopt a regularized empirical risk minimization framework in which we minimize:
J(θ;D) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
`(φ′(xn; θ),yn) + λR(θ). (5)
with respect to θ, where `(·) is a loss function, R(·) is a regularizer, and λ ≥ 0 is a regularization
parameter. Some of the methods make one or more of the following assumptions:
1. The loss function `(·) is strictly convex, continuous, and differentiable everywhere.
2. The regularizer R(θ) is 1-strongly convex, continuous, and differentiable everywhere w.r.t. θ.
3. The model φ′(·) is linear, i.e., φ′(x; θ) = θ>x.
4. The loss function `(·) is Lipschitz with a constant K, i.e., ‖∇l‖2 ≤ K.
5. The inputs are contained in the unit L2 ball, i.e. ‖x‖2 ≤ 1 for all x.
In the following, we denote by ‖A‖F the Frobenius norm of the matrix A, i.e.:
‖A‖F =
∑
i,j
A2ij
1/2 . (6)
We use Lemma 1 in the privacy proofs for the model and prediction sensitivity methods.
Lemma 1. Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and letting θ1 = arg minθ J(θ;D) and θ2 =
arg minθ J(θ;D′), the sensitivity is bounded as ‖θ1 − θ2‖F ≤ 2KNλ .
Proof. To bound the sensitivity, let G(θ) = J(θ;D) and g(θ) = J(θ;D′) − J(θ;D). Note that
θ1 = arg minθ G(θ) and θ2 = arg minθ G(θ) + g(θ). Given Assumptions 1 and 2, we can apply
Lemma 7 of [8] to get:
‖θ1 − θ2‖F ≤ 1
λ
max
θ
‖∇g(θ)‖F . (7)
Next we bound ‖∇g(θ)‖F . Let x,y and x′,y′ be the differing examples in D and D′. Using
assumption 3, we have:
g(θ) =
1
N
(`(θ>x,y)− `(θ>x′,y′)). (8)
Thus:
∇g(θ) = 1
N
(∇`(θ>x,y)x> −∇`(θ>x′,y′)x′>), (9)
and:
‖∇g(θ)‖F
=
1
N
∥∥∇`(θ>x,y)x> −∇`(θ>x′,y′)x′>∥∥
F
≤ 1
N
(∥∥∇`(θ>x,y)x>∥∥
F
+
∥∥∇`(θ>x′,y′)x′>∥∥
F
)
≤ 1
N
(∥∥∇`(θ>x,y)∥∥
2
‖x‖2 +
∥∥∇`(θ>x′,y′)∥∥
2
‖x′‖2
)
≤ 1
N
K (‖x‖2 + ‖x′‖2)
≤ 2K
N
.
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We use the triangle inequality in the third step, the fact that ‖uv>‖F = ‖u‖2‖v‖2 in the fourth step,
and assumptions 4 and 5 in steps five and six respectively. Thus we have:
‖∇g(θ)‖F ≤ 2K
N
. (10)
Combining Equations 7 and 10 yields:
‖θ1 − θ2‖F ≤ 2K
Nλ
, (11)
completing the proof.
For the perturbations used by the sensitivity methods, we sample noise from the distribution:
p(B) =
1
z
e−β‖B‖F , (12)
where z is a normalizing constant. When δ > 0 we use a zero-mean isotropic Gaussian distribution
with a standard deviation of σ:
p(B) =
1
z
e−
1
2σ2
‖B‖2F , (13)
where z is a normalizing constant.
B Private Training
B.1 Model Sensitivity
We generalize the sensitivity method of [8] to the setting of multi-class classification. The multi-class
model sensitivity method achieves -differential privacy with respect to the dataset D when releasing
the model parameters θ. In this case, the budget of test examples is infinite since the model itself is
differentially private. The model sensitivity method is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Multi-class model sensitivity.
Inputs: Privacy parameter , regularization parameter λ, and dataset D.
Output: θpriv, the -differentially private classifier.
Sample B from the distribution in Equation 12 with β = Nλ2K .
Compute θpriv = arg minθ J(θ;D) +B.
Theorem 1. Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the model sensitivity method in Algorithm 1 is
-differentially private.
Proof. We bound the privacy loss in terms of the sensitivity of the minimizer of J(·) (Equation 5) in
the Frobenius norm and then apply Lemma 1. We denote by A the application of differential privacy
mechanism, i.e. a run of Algorithm 1.
For all datasets D and D′ which differ by one example, we have:
log
p(A(D) = θ)
p(A(D′) = θ)
= log
e−β‖θ1+B‖F
e−β‖θ2+B‖F
= β (‖θ2 +B‖F − ‖θ1 +B‖F )
≤ β‖θ1 − θ2‖F ,
where we use the triangle inequality, and the fact that: θ1 = arg minθ J(θ;D) and θ2 =
arg minθ J(θ;D′). Thus:
log
p(A(D) = θ)
p(A(D′) = θ) ≤ β‖θ1 − θ2‖F . (14)
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Combining Equation 14 with Lemma 1 yields:
log
p(A(D) = θ)
p(A(D′) = θ) ≤ β‖θ1 − θ2‖F ≤
β2K
Nλ
. (15)
Thus if we choose β = Nλ2K , we achieve -differential privacy.
The model sensitivity method in Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-differentially private with δ = 0. By letting
δ > 0, we can use noise from a Gaussian distribution.
Algorithm 2 Analytic Gaussian mechanism [2].
Inputs: Privacy parameters  and δ.
Output: Scalar α used to compute the variance of the Guassian noise distribution.
Let δ0 = Φ(0)− eΦ(−
√
2).
if δ ≥ δ0 then
Define B+ (v) = Φ(
√
v)− eΦ(−√(v + 2)).
Find v∗ = sup{v ∈ R≥0 : B+ (v) ≤ δ}.
Let α =
√
1 + v
∗
/2−√v∗/2.
else
Define B− (u) = Φ(−
√
u)− eΦ(−√(u+ 2)).
Find u∗ = inf{u ∈ R≥0 : B− (u) ≤ δ}.
end if
We use the analytic Gaussian mechanism of [2], which results in better privacy parameters at the
same noise scale than the standard Gaussian mechanism [13]. We rely on Algorithm 2, a subroutine
of Algorithm 1 from [2], in order to compute the α required by the analytic Gaussian mechanism.
Following [2], we note that B+ (v) and B
−
 (u) are monotonic functions and use binary search to find
the value of v∗ and u∗ in Algorithm 2 up to arbitrary precision.
Algorithm 3 Multi-class Gaussian model sensitivity.
Inputs: Privacy parameters  and δ, regularization parameter λ, and dataset D.
Output: θpriv, the (, δ)-differentially private classifier.
Compute α using Algorithm 2.
Sample B from the distribution in Equation 13 with σ = 2Kα
Nλ
√
2
.
Compute θpriv = arg minθ J(θ;D) +B.
Theorem 2. Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the Gaussian model sensitivity method in Algorithm 3
is (, δ)-differentially private for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. From Lemma 1, we have a bound on the sensitivity of θ(D) = arg minθ′ J(θ′;D):
max
D,D′
‖θ(D)− θ(D′)‖F ≤ 2K
Nλ
. (16)
We apply Theorem 8 of [2] which states that for any  ≥ 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), the Gaussian mechanism
with standard deviation σ provides (, δ)-differential privacy if and only if:
Φ
(
∆2f
2σ
− σ
∆2f
)
− eΦ
(
−∆2f
2σ
− σ
∆2f
)
≤ δ, (17)
where ∆2f is the L2 sensitivity of the function f(D), and Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the standard univariate Gaussian distribution.
Combining the upper bound on ∆2f from Equation 16 with Theorem 9 of [2] shows that the Gaussian
model sensitivity method in Algorithm 3 is (, δ)-differentially private.
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B.2 Loss Perturbation
We generalize the loss perturbation method of [8] to the multi-class setting. We use the slighly
modified mobjective of [23]:
J(θ;D) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
`(φ′(xn; θ),yn) +
λ
N
R(θ), (18)
where we assume that both `(·) and R(·) are convex with continuous Hessians and that φ′(·) is linear.
The multi-class loss perturbation method is given in Algorithm 4 where the function tr(A) is the
trace of a square matrix A.
Algorithm 4 Multi-class loss perturbation.
Inputs: Privacy parameter  and dataset D.
Output: θpriv, the -differentially private classifier.
Set ρ ≥ 2LC .
Sample B from the distribution in Equation 12 with β = 2K .
Compute θpriv = arg minθ J(θ;D) + 1N tr(B>θ) + ρ2N ‖θ‖2F .
We require additional notation to state and prove the privacy theorem of Algorithm 4. First, we let
vec(A) denote the vectorization of the matrix A constructed by stacking the rows of A into a vector.
If A ∈ Rn×m then vec(A) ∈ Rnm. Second, we rely on the standard Kronecker product which we
denote by the symbol ⊗. For two vectors we have u⊗ v = vec(uv>). We let λmax(A) denote the
maximum eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix A.
Theorem 3. Given a convex loss `(·), a convex regularizer R(·) with continuous Hessians, assump-
tions 3, 4, and 5, and assuming that λmax(∇2`) ≤ L, the loss perturbation method in Algorithm 4 is
-differentially private.
Proof. The proof structure here closely follows that of Theorem 9 in [8] and Theorem 2 in [23] with
the appropriate generalizations to account for the multi-class setting.
Let w = vec(θ) and b = vec(B). We aim to bound the ratio of the two densities:
g(θpriv | D)
g(θpriv | D′) =
g(wpriv | D)
g(wpriv | D′) . (19)
By the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 9 of [8], there is a bijection from wpriv to b for
every D. Hence the ratio in Equation 19 can be written as:
g(wpriv | D)
g(wpriv | D′) =
µ(b | D)
µ(b′ | D′) ·
|det(J(wpriv → b | D))|−1
|det(J(wpriv → b′ | D′))|−1 , (20)
where µ(·) is the conditional noise density given dataset D and J(wpriv → b | D) is the Jacobian of
the mapping from wpriv to b for a given D.
We bound each term in Equation 20, starting with a bound on the ratio of the determinants of the
Jacobians.
For any wpriv and D, we can solve for the noise term b added to the objective in Algorithm 4:
b = −λ∇R(wpriv)−
N∑
i=1
∇`⊗ xi − ρwpriv, (21)
where we use the short-hand ∇a`(a) = ∇`. By assumption 3, we have ∇θ` = ∇`x> and hence
∇w` = ∇`⊗ x.
We can differentiate Equation 21 to get:
∇b = −λ∇2R(wpriv)−
N∑
i=1
∇2`⊗ (xix>i )− ρIDC , (22)
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where IDC is the DC-dimensional identity matrix.
Without loss of generality, let D′ contain one more example than D which we denote by x′,y′, i.e.
D′ = D ∪ {(x′,y′)}. We define the matrices A and E as:
A = λ∇2R(wpriv) +
N∑
i=1
∇2`⊗ (xix>i ) + ρIDC , (23)
and:
E = ∇2`⊗ (x′x′>). (24)
Thus:
|det(J(wpriv → b′ | D′))|
|det(J(wpriv → b | D))| =
|det(A+E)|
|det(A)| . (25)
Given that ∇2` ∈ RC×C we know that Rank(∇2`) ≤ C. Since Rank(xx>) = 1, we have that
Rank(∇2`⊗ (xx>)) ≤ C [18], and thus Rank(E) ≤ C. Thus we can apply Lemma 2 to bound the
ratio:
|det(A+E)|
|det(A)| ≤ (1 + λmax(A
−1E))C . (26)
Given that R(·) and `(·) are convex, the eigenvalues of A are at least ρ, and thus λmax(A−1E) ≤
1
ρλmax(E). Given the assumption that λmax(∇2`) ≤ L and by assumption 5 λmax(xx>) ≤ 1, we
have that λmax(∇2` ⊗ (xx>)) ≤ L [18], thus λmax(E) ≤ L. Combining these observations with
Equations 25 and 26, we have a bound on the ratio:
|det(J(wpriv → b′ | D′))|
|det(J(wpriv → b | D))| ≤
(
1 +
L
ρ
)C
. (27)
Since ρ ≥ 2LC , we have: (
1 +
L
ρ
)C
≤
(
1 +

2C
)C
≤ e/2, (28)
using the identity 1 + x ≤ ex for all x. Thus we have a final bound on the ratio:
|det(J(wpriv → b′ | D′))|
|det(J(wpriv → b | D))| ≤ e
/2. (29)
Next, we bound the ratio µ(b|D)µ(b′|D′) . From Equation 21 we have:
b′ − b = ∇`⊗ x′. (30)
Thus:
‖b′‖2 − ‖b‖2 ≤ ‖b′ − b‖2 = ‖∇`⊗ x′‖2 ≤ ‖∇`‖2‖x′‖2 ≤ K, (31)
where we use the triangle inequality in the first step, the fact that ‖u⊗ v‖2 = ‖uv>‖F = ‖u‖2‖v‖2
in the third step, and assumptions 4 and 5 in the fifth step. Following the argument in the proof of
Theorem 9 of [8], we have:
µ(b | D)
µ(b′ | D′) ≤ e

2K (‖b‖2−‖b′‖2). (32)
Combining Equations 31 and 32, we have:
µ(b | D)
µ(b′ | D′) ≤ e
/2. (33)
Finally, combining Equations 20, 29 and 33, yields:
g(wpriv | D)
g(wpriv | D′) =
µ(b | D)
µ(b′ | D′) ·
|det(J(wpriv → b | D))|−1
|det(J(wpriv → b′ | D′))|−1 ≤ e
/2e/2 ≤ e, (34)
completing the proof.
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Algorithm 5 Multi-class Gaussian loss perturbation.
Inputs: Privacy parameters  and δ, and dataset D.
Output: θpriv, the (, δ)-differentially private classifier.
Set ρ ≥ 2LC .
Sample B from the distribution in Equation 13 with σ = K
√
8 log(2/δ) + 4.
Compute θpriv = arg minθ J(θ,D) + 1N tr(B>θ) + ρ2N ‖θ‖2F .
We can use noise from a Gaussian distribution by letting δ > 0 [23]. We generalize the approach
of [23] to the multi-class setting.
Theorem 4. Given a convex loss `(·), a convex regularizer R(·) with continuous Hessians, assump-
tions 3, 4, and 5, and assuming that λmax(∇2`) ≤ L, the loss perturbation method in Algorithm 5 is
(, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Let w = vec(θ) and b = vec(B). We aim to bound the ratio of the two densities:
g(θpriv | D)
g(θpriv | D′) =
g(wpriv | D)
g(wpriv | D′) , (35)
with probability at least 1− δ.
As in Theorem 3, there is a bijection from wpriv to b for every D. Hence the ratio in Equation 35 can
be written as:
g(wpriv | D)
g(wpriv | D′) =
µ(b | D)
µ(b′ | D′) ·
|det(J(wpriv → b | D))|−1
|det(J(wpriv → b′ | D′))|−1 , (36)
where µ(·) is the conditional noise density given dataset D and J(wpriv → b | D) is the Jacobian of
the mapping from wpriv to b for a given D.
From Equation 29 in the proof of Theorem 3, we have that:
|det(J(wpriv → b | D))|−1
|det(J(wpriv → b′ | D′))|−1 ≤ e
/2. (37)
Following the same arguments as the proof of Theorem 2 in [23], we have with at least probability
1− δ:
µ(b | D)
µ(b′ | D′) ≤ e
1
2β2
(
βK
√
8 log(2/δ)+K2
)
. (38)
If we choose β ≥ K
√
8 log(2/δ) + 4 then:
µ(b | D)
µ(b′ | D′) ≤ e
/2. (39)
Combining Equations 36, 37 and 39 yields:
g(wpriv | D)
g(wpriv | D′) ≤ e
, (40)
with probability at least 1− δ, completing the proof.
Lemma 2. Given symmetric and positive semidefinite matrices, A and E, if A is full rank, and E
has rank at most C, then:
det(A+E)
detA
≤ (1 + λmax(A−1E))C , (41)
where λmax(A−1E) is the maximum eigenvalue of A−1E.
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Proof.
det(A+E)
detA
= det (I+A−1E)
=
C∏
c=1
(1 + λc(A
−1E))
≤ (1 + λmax(A−1E))C .
In the second step we use the facts that λi(I+A−1E) = 1 + λi(A−1E) and that A−1E has rank at
most C and hence has at most C nonzero eigenvalues.
C Private Prediction
C.1 Prediction Sensitivity
The prediction sensitivity method protects the privacy of the underlying training dataset, D, by adding
a unique noise vector to the logit predictions, φ′(xˆ; θ), for each test example xˆ.
The prediction sensitivity method is given in Algorithm 6. The algorithm accepts as input a budget B
of test examples and guarantees -differential privacy of D until the budget is exhausted after which
the privacy of D degrades.
Algorithm 6 Multi-class prediction sensitivity.
Inputs: Privacy parameter , non-private model φ′(·), test example xˆ, and budget B.
Output: yˆpriv, the prediction which is -differentially private with respect to the training dataset D.
Sample b from the distribution in Equation 12 with β = Nλ2KB .
Compute yˆpriv = φ′(xˆ; θ) + b.
Theorem 5. Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the prediction sensitivity method in Algorithm 6 is
-differentially private.
Proof. The proof proceeds the same way as that of Theorem 1. First, we bound the privacy loss in
terms of the sensitivity of the minimizer of J(·) in the Frobenius norm and then we apply Lemma 1.
Let θ1 = arg minθ J(θ;D) and θ2 = arg minθ J(θ;D′). For all datasets D and D′ which differ by
one example and all x, we have:
log
p(A(D,x) = y)
p(A(D′,x) = y)
= log
e−β‖θ
>
1 x+b‖2
e−β‖θ>2 x+b‖2
= β
(‖θ>2 x+ b‖2 − ‖θ>1 x+ b‖2)
≤ β‖θ>1 x− θ>2 x‖2
≤ β‖(θ1 − θ2)>x‖2,
where we use the triangle inequality in the second to last step. We also have that:
‖(θ1 − θ2)>x‖2 ≤ ‖θ1 − θ2‖F ‖x‖2 ≤ ‖θ1 − θ2‖F , (42)
where we use Cauchy-Schwarz in the first inequality and assumption 5 in the second. Thus:
log
p(A(D,x) = y)
p(A(D′,x) = y) ≤ β‖θ1 − θ2‖F . (43)
Combining Equation 43 with Lemma 1 yields:
log
p(A(D,x) = y)
p(A(D′,x) = y) ≤ β‖θ1 − θ2‖F ≤
β2K
Nλ
. (44)
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If we choose β = Nλ2K , we achieve -differential privacy when releasing the predictions on a single
example x. If we choose β = Nλ2KB then by standard compositional arguments of differential
privacy [12] we achieve -differential privacy with a budget of B test queries.
Algorithm 7 Multi-class Gaussian prediction sensitivity.
Inputs: Privacy parameters  and δ, non-private model φ′(·), test example xˆ, and budget B.
Output: yˆpriv, the prediction which is (, δ)-differentially private with respect to the training
dataset D.
Let σ′ = 2Kα
Nλ
√
2∗
with α computed using Algorithm 2, ∗ = /B, and δ∗ = δ/B.
Minimize σ′′ = 2Kα
Nλ
√
2∗
over δ′ ∈ (0, δ −Bδ∗) using linear search where:
∗ =
√
2/B
(√
ln(1/δ′) + −√ln(1/δ′)),
δ∗ = (δ − δ′)/B,
and where α is computed using Algorithm 2.
Sample b from the distribution in Equation 13 with σ = min(σ′, σ′′).
Compute yˆpriv = φ′(xˆ; θ) + b.
Theorem 6. Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the Gaussian prediction sensitivity method in
Algorithm 7 is (, δ)-differentially private for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we bound the L2 sensitivity and apply Theorem 9 of [2].
Let θ1 = arg minθ J(θ;D) and similarly θ2 = arg minθ J(θ;D′). From Theorem 5 we have:
max
D,D′,x
‖θ>1 x− θ>2 x‖2 ≤
2K
Nλ
. (45)
Recall from our description of the Gaussian model sensitivity method that Theorem 8 of [2] states
that the Gaussian mechanism with standard deviation σ′ is (∗, δ∗)-differentially private if and only
if:
Φ
(
∆2f
2σ′
− 
∗σ′
∆2f
)
− e∗Φ
(
−∆2f
2σ′
− 
∗σ′
∆2f
)
≤ δ∗, (46)
where ∆2f is the L2 sensitivity of f(·).
Combining Equation 45 with Theorem 9 of [2], we can obtain (∗, δ∗)-differential privacy on a single
prediction by setting:
σ′′ =
2Kα
Nλ
√
2∗
, (47)
where α is defined in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 1.1 of [14] states that B compositions of a (∗, δ∗)-differentially private mechanism satisfies
(, δ)-differential privacy where:
 =
√
2B ln(1/δ′)∗ +B∗(e
∗ − 1)/2, (48)
and:
δ = δ′ +Bδ∗. (49)
We can solve for ∗ and δ∗ in terms of , δ and δ′. Given that  and δ are pre-specified, this leaves δ′
to be determined.
Using the fact that 1 + x ≤ ex for all x, we have:√
2B ln(1/δ′)∗ +B(∗)2/2 ≤
√
2B ln(1/δ′)∗ +B∗(e
∗ − 1)/2. (50)
This is a quadratic in ∗ which we can solve to obtain:
∗ =
√
2/B
(√
ln(1/δ′) + −
√
ln(1/δ′)
)
. (51)
We also have:
δ∗ = (δ − δ′)/B. (52)
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The algorithm will be (, δ)-differentially private with respect to B predictions for any ∗ and δ∗
which satisfy the above equations. Thus, for a given , δ and B, we can choose δ′ which minimizes
σ′′ in Equation 47 and achieve (, δ)-differential privacy with a budget B.
For small values of the budget B, the standard composition theorem of (, δ)-differential privacy
(e.g., Theorem 3.16 of [10]) may actually lead to smaller standard deviations in the Gaussian noise
distribution. Combining the standard composition theorem with Equation 45 and Theorem 9 of [2],
we can obtain (, δ)-differential privacy on a single prediction by setting:
σ′ =
2Kα
Nλ
√
2∗
, (53)
where α is obtained via Algorithm 2 with ∗ = /B and δ∗ δ/B.
Because both σ′ and σ′′ provide the required differential privacy guarantee, so does the mechanism
in Algorithm 7 that sets σ = min(σ′, σ′′).
C.2 Subsample-and-Aggregate
The subsample-and-aggregate approach of [11] splits the training dataset D into T disjoint subsets
of size |D|/T . A set of T models, {φ′1(·; θ1), . . . , φ′T (·; θT )}, are learned, one for each subset, where
φ′t(·) outputs a one-hot vector of size C. To make a prediction, the classifiers are combined using a
soft majority vote. For a given x, the class label y is predicted with probability proportional to:
exp (β · |{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(x; θt) = y}|) . (54)
Privacy by classifying with probability proportional to an exponentiated utility function is known as
the exponential mechanism [13] and is due to [28].
Algorithm 8 Subsample-and-aggregate.
Inputs: Privacy parameters  and δ, training dataset D, a number of models T , and a set of queries
Q = {xˆ1, . . . , xˆB}.
Output: {yˆ1, . . . yˆB}, the predictions which are -differentially private with respect to the training
dataset D.
Partition D into T disjoint subsets {Dt : t = 1, . . . , T} of size b|D|/Tc.
for all Dt do
Train classifier φ′t(·; θt) on Dt.
end for
if δ > 0 then
Set β = max
(
/B,
√
2/B
(√
ln(1/δ) + −√ln(1/δ))).
else
Set β = /B.
end if
for b = 1, . . . , B do
Sample yˆb with probability proportional to Equation 54.
end for
Theorem 7. The subsample-and-aggregate method in Algorithm 8 with β = /B is -differentially
private.
Proof. Consider any two datasetsD andD′ which differ by at most one example. Since the classifiers
φ′t(·) are trained on disjoint subsets of D, at most one classifier can change its prediction for any
given instance x when we switch from training onD toD′. If we let φ′t(·; θ) denote classifiers trained
on D and φ′t(·; θ′) denote classifiers trained on D′, we have:
arg max
D,D′,x,y
∣∣∣|{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(x; θt) = y}| − |{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(x; θ′t) = y}|∣∣∣ ≤ 1. (55)
20
In other words, the sensitivity of the majority vote is 1. For all adjacent datasets, D and D′, all
examples x, and all class labels y:
log
p(A(x,D) = y)
p(A(x,D′) = y) = log
exp(β · |{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(x; θt) = y}|)
exp(β · |{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(x; θ′t) = y}|)
(56)
≤ β · |{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(x; θt) = y}| − β · |{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(x; θ′t) = y}| (57)
≤ β
∣∣∣|{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(x; θt) = y}| − |{t : t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, φ′t(x; θ′t) = y}|∣∣∣ (58)
≤ β, (59)
where we use Equation 55 in the second to last step.
Thus if we set β = /B, by standard compositional arguments [12], we achieve -differential privacy
with a budget of B test queries by predicting y with probability proportional to Equation 54.
We can achieve a better scaling of β with the budget B by letting δ > 0 and relying on the advanced
composition theorem [15].
Theorem 8. The subsample-and-aggregate method in Algorithm 8 with β = max(β′, β′′), where
β′ = /B and β′′ =
√
2/B
(√
ln(1/δ) + −√ln(1/δ)), is (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. From Theorem 7, the subsample-and-aggregate method with B = 1 is (β, 0)-differentially
private.
Theorem 1.1 of [14] states that B compositions of a (β, 0)-differentially private mechanism satisfies(√
2B ln(1/δ)β +Bβ(eβ − 1)/2, δ
)
. We can solve for β such that the subsample-and-aggregate
algorithm with a budget of B satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy. Using the fact that 1 + x ≤ ex for
all x, we have: √
2B ln(1/δ)β +Bβ2/2 ≤
√
2B ln(1/δ)β +Bβ(eβ − 1)/2. (60)
Hence if
√
2B ln(1/δ)β + Bβ2/2 ≤  then the resulting algorithm will satisfy (, δ)-differential
privacy. This is a quadratic in β which we can solve to obtain:
β =
√
2/B
(√
ln(1/δ) + −
√
ln(1/δ)
)
. (61)
If this value of β is smaller than /B, we can use Theorem 7 instead and set β = /B.
D Multi-class Logistic Loss
In practice, we need to specify `(θ>x,y) and bound ‖∇`‖2 for the model sensitivity and loss
perturbation methods. The commonly used multi-class logistic loss is given by:
`(a,y) =
C∑
i=1
yi log
eai∑C
j=1 e
aj
, (62)
where, for linear models, a = θ>x.
Theorem 9. The Lipschitz constant of the multi-class logistic loss (Equation 62) is K =
√
2.
Proof. Since y ∈ ∆C , we can write Equation 62 as:
`(a,y) = y>a− logZ, (63)
where Z =
∑C
j=1 e
aj , which has a gradient given by:
∇` = y − 1
Z
ea. (64)
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By Corollary 1 the maximum L2 distance between any two points on the probability simplex
√
2.
Given that both y, 1Z e
a ∈ ∆C :
‖∇`‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥y − ea∑C
j=1 e
aj
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
√
2. (65)
For the loss perturbation method we also need to bound the eigenvalues and the rank of the Hessian
of Equation 62 with respect to a.
The Hessian of the multi-class logistic loss with respect to a is given by:
∇2` = diag(p)− pp>, (66)
where p = 1Z e
a [5]. Since ∇2` ∈ RC×C , the rank is at most C.
Theorem 10. The eigenvalues of the Hessian of the multi-class logistic loss are bounded by 0.5, i.e.:
λmax(∇2`(θ,x,y)) ≤ 0.5, (67)
for all θ,x and y.
Proof. The Hessian of the multi-class logistic loss is given by Equation 66. We use the fact that the
eigenvalues of a square matrix A are contained in the union of the Gerschgorin discs constructed
from the rows of A [19]. The Gerschgorin disc of the i-th row of A has a center at Aii and a radius
of
∑
j 6=i |Aij |. Hence, an upper bound on the i-th Gerschgorin disc of diag(p)− pp> is given by:
(pi − p2i ) + pi
C∑
j=1
j 6=i
pj = pi(1− pi) + pi(1− pi) ≤ 0.25 + 0.25 = 0.5, (68)
where we use the facts that
∑C
j=1
j 6=i
pj = 1− pi and (1− pi)pi ≤ 0.25 for pi ∈ [0, 1]. Hence:
λmax(∇2`) ≤ 0.5. (69)
We rely on the following Corollary to bound the L2 distance between two points on the probability
simplex, ∆C .
Corollary 1. For any two points u and v on the (C−1)-dimensional probability simplex their L2
distance is no more than
√
2, i.e.:
max
u,v∈∆C
‖u− v‖2 ≤
√
2. (70)
Proof. Bauer’s maximum principle states that a convex function on a convex set attains its maximum
at an extreme point [25]. The L2 norm is a convex function, the simplex ∆C is a convex set. The
extreme points of the simplex are when u and v are vertices which for ∆C implies they are standard
basis vectors. The L2 distance between two standard basis vectors is
√
2.
22
